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Research on interest groups goes back at least to Cicero. He distinguished parties (partes) 
from factions (factio). A faction worked in its own interests whereas a party sought to 
discover the common good. Since then only the details of inquiry into interest groups 
have changed. Two thousand years on, the question of what political systems promote 
good interest groups still excites and maddens researchers. Thinking on this question 
sputtered until Montesquieu and later Madison explained how government institutions 
could be structured to limit the power of factions. Madison, in his #10 Federalist paper, 
argued that factions could be contained by dividing power between competing branches 
of government and by encouraging factions to be numerous so none would come to  
dominate government.  
 
The greatest minds in political economy have focused on interest groups in order to 
understand how power flows, just as Boltzman and the atomists of the mid-19
th century 
focused on the atom as a mental device for understanding thermodynamics. De 
Tocqueville,  Marx, Toynbee, Orwell; the names go off like cannons. These thinkers 
sought to build a science of power, but their writings as those of most political sages of 
this century are descriptive. Their attempts at generalization are either too grand or dotted 
with exceptions. The leap from musings to science took place in the 1940’s and 50’s with 
the work of Duncan Black (1958). Black drew on the writings of these earlier greats to 
propose the first formal model of how interest groups rise to power. His median voter 
model is simple but was a base from which to formulate testable hypotheses about how 
interest groups work.  
 
Black’s median voter model suggested that in a democracy, provided the preferences of 
voters over policy alternatives are ordered in a special way known as single-peaked, 
power will go to the median voter. The first tests of the Black model had to wait thirty 
years until studies such as those of Pommerehne and  Frey (1976) began to see whether 
median income determined government spending better than mean income in both direct 
democracy and representative democracy . Theirs and similar studies that followed seem to vindicate the median voter view of policy-making but suffer from being joint tests of 
political equilibrium and the hypothesis that power flows to the median voter. If the 
median voter model is false, it is possible that positive results are due to a political 
disequilibrium.  
 
The median voter model does not try to explain how interest groups wield power.  Black 
was almost silent on the machinations of special interest groups and preferred to study the 
machinations of committees. His model rather is like the Modigliani-Miller theorem of 
corporate finance; a model we know to not describe reality perfectly but which frames 
our questions on what is missing from our understanding. Insights about the power of 
interest groups comes from noting “frictions” in political systems that lead politicians to 
deviate from the interests of the median voter. Noting what causes the deviation between 
median interests and politician behaviour is crucial to understanding the circumstances 
under which a special interest group (Cicero’s factio) will have the whip hand over a 
public interest group. Can voters be consistently fooled? Are preferences single or many-
peaked and so are laws subject to agenda control? Can politicians create artificial barriers 
to the entry of competing parties and ideas coming from public interest groups? Do 
special interest groups benefit from a built-in technological advantage that allows them to 
push their ideas ahead of others?  An affirmative answer to these questions will tilt power 
to the side of special interests.  
 
Knowing when power will tilt to the side of special interests has fascinated researchers 
because a political system that serves special interests will forgo the benefits of 
government projects and institutions that work in the public good. Public goods benefit 
everyone and are a sort of cauldron from which emerges economic growth. In Plagues 
and Peoples William H. McNeil (1976) argued that parasitism by special interests is 
similar to parasitism by microorganisms. Predation by the large and the small undermine 
cooperation and fruitful public ventures and so are forces of entropy. A society which 
wishes to increase its wealth must find ways either to eliminate the predators or coax 
them into a symbiotic union with the host of people who amass resources and so combat 
entropy. McNeill sees democracy as a late step in the evolution of economic predators and prey in which the parasitical overhead, or political profits that people pay for their 
public goods is on a downward curve greased by political competition in orderly 
elections.  
 
Before we can accept McNeill’s grand vision of interest group evolution we need to 
know the parameters that egg on interest groups. Mancur Olson (1965) used a mix of old-
fashioned political economy, journalistic inquiry, and public choice insight in his 
investigation of collective action to argue that interest groups which have low costs of 
containing free riders in their ranks will have an advantage over interest groups who 
cannot control free riders. Political scientists took up this insight but it lay dormant in the 
Public Choice field until George Stigler reanimated it in 1971 in testable form. Stigler 
battened on the hypothesis that groups whose interests were concentrated would be better 
able to influence government than groups whose interests were diffuse. In his empirical 
explorations he used this hypothesis to guide him in his finding that the main 
beneficiaries of regulation in the consumer interest were not consumers but the regulated 
firms. Samuel Peltzman (1976) put Stigler’s argument in maths by saying that regulators, 
or political brokers, maximize a value function (most often interpreted as votes gained) 
into which enter positively the utilities of consumers and of the predatory producers who 
seek through regulation to extort wealth from these consumers. Political middlemen 
redistribute income between the two groups to the point where the marginal loss in votes 
from consumers equaled the marginal gain in votes from producers.  
 
Peltzman’s article came to be one of the most cited articles in economics but its weakness 
was in assuming that the tradeoff between consumer and producer interests was linear.  
Gary Becker grafted onto Peltzman’s model the insight that an interest group which preys 
on another is like a pickpocket. The thief damages his victim by stealing money and by 
forcing the victim to dash about replacing credit and identity cards. More technically the 
interest group harms its victim by taking money and by imposing deadweight losses. 
Becker’s insight was to recognize that deadweight losses put a exponential break on 
predation. He took Harberger’s insight that deadweight losses are proportional to the 
square of the tax, and used it to argue that a linear increase in takings by a predatory interest group will provoke a non-linear increase in the deadweight losses its victim 
suffers. These rapidly increasing losses will prod victims to invest equivalent sums in 
resisting attempts on their wealth. The advance of predators, fueled by linear incentives 
slows before the stiffening resistance of prey outraged by non-linear damages.  
 
Becker’s model has been seen by some as implying that politics are efficient because 
deadweight losses are a break to predation. This conclusion has weight if we hold 
constant all other forces that influence political outcomes and the conclusion fits neatly 
into McNeill’s hypothesis that virulent predators evolve into benign symbiotes, but the 
conclusion comes from a partial reading of Becker’s model. The outcome of a contest 
between interest groups depends also on combatant’s political savvy. Groups with the gift 
of intrigue, or with more guns, can laugh at deadweight losses and impose their will for 
generations, as the sad example of African dictatorships shows. Palda (1997) has shown 
that there can gaping contradictions in the fiscal policies of democracies, as in the case 
where governments churn their finances by transfering money to someone and taxing that 
money back, and Rowley and Vachris have given a thorough account of the frictions and 
problems inherent in evolving towards an efficient democracy. To date no one has traced 
the path by which political efficiency can evolve. Perhaps the best hope for such an 
understanding will be to carry over to public choice Thomas Ray’s (1992)  computer 
simulation (the Tierra model) of the evolution of parasites and prey by grafting some 
measure of the deadweight loss of government and see how this deadweight loss will 
evolve under different political rules.   
 
Becker’s analysis is so general that its hull can fit around just about any sort of relation 
between interest groups. The model applies as well to dictatorships as it does to 
democracies. What is remarkable is that what some may see as a Dr. Seuss version of 
political modeling can make powerful testable predictions about interest groups. In a 
paper with Casey Mulligan (1998) Becker found that  governments with efficient tax 
systems that impose small deadweight losses per dollar raised tend to be larger than 
governments with inefficient tax systems. This finding is indirect confirmation of 
theoretical musings which have tried to weld interest groups to the median voter model.   
Austen-Smith’s (1987) model of interest group influence grew out of the theoretical 
poverty of service-induced campaign contribution models of interest groups. These 
earlier models were intellectual islands lying outside the Stigler-Peltzman-Becker view of 
politics and the Black median voter model, and saw interest groups as moustache-twirling 
capitalists who could buy government protection for their businesses and pet concerns 
with election campaign contributions. Policy played no role in the success of politicians. 
Empirical work by Snyder (1990) gave feeble support to this caricature.  
 
Austen-Smith’s path breaking work set out a theoretical model of policy in which interest 
groups can only buy influence contrary to the public interest by exploiting the public’s 
ignorance of where politicians stand. Politicians serve two masters: voters who have 
preferences for a public good and special interest groups who help politicians 
communicate with voters for a price paid in government favours. The conclusion that 
comes out of Austen-Smith’s model is that policy tends towards the median voter’s 
wishes, but deviates from that tendency the greater is voter ignorance. The greater this 
ignorance the more can special interests sup at the public’s cost. Voter ignorance in the 
Becker model is a function of self-interest. Special interests and their political middlemen 
who impose large deadweight losses on voters give voters a reason to become informed 
about policy and so to resist the inefficient growth of government. Becker’s finding that 
efficient tax systems dovetail with large governments could be seen as a manifestation of 
political systems where efficient tax policies lull voters and allow politicians and their 
supporting special interests to coast like pilot fish dragging on the skins of productive 
citizens.  
 
Austen-Smith (1997) believes that the modeling of interest group behaviour is in its early 
stages and that because we know so little about the path by which information comes to 
voters and resounds with them that “there is little hope of saying anything normative 
about whether any induced influence over policy is good or bad.” This is a backhand at 
what is perhaps one of the most surprising and original contributions of public choice to the understanding of what drives interest groups and whether their activities are 
productive; the theory of rent-seeking.  
 
Rent-seeking is a term that evokes images of landlords shaking down tenants for a few 
coppers. Such imagery is unfortunate because it cuts off policymakers and the public 
from seeing the dangers of a political system that encouragers pie-cutters above pie 
makers. The Holy Grail of rent-seeking research is to discover whether in the contest for 
government favours interest groups together spend as much or more than the prize being 
sought. The work of Reinganum (1982) into patent races and the huge literature in 
tournament theory which Lazear and Rosen (1979) spawned show that concern about 
whether disputes over resources destroy those resources are not restricted to the public 
choice field.  
 
The rent-seeking literature takes as its basic tool a power function popularized by Tullock 
(1980). This “logistic power function” states that the probability a group wins 
government influence over other groups depends on how much it spends relative to those 
groups and on a parameter called political talent which translates expenditure into 
political success. The logistic power function is to public choice what the Cobb-Douglas 
function is to microeconomics: a simple, intuitive, function consistent with many 
different micro-formulations of power.  
 
Rent-seeking theory says little about inner workings of interest groups. Rent-seeking 
theory describes the efforts interest groups will invest in forming policy given a certain 
reward from government, given the rules for obtaining that reward, and given how 
politically astute are these groups. If competing groups are of similar political skill they 
will each believe themselves close to the government prize. In their striving they may 
dissipate all or even more than all the value of the favour government has to grant. This is 
both a positive and normative insight. Empirical work can proceed by looking at 
circumstances where politicians have the discretion to grant favours and seeing whether 
special interest groups are particularly active in such areas. Discretion fuels the hope of 
interests groups that by spending money to influence government the dice of power will roll their way. Here, for the first time in thousands of years of political research is a 
formal proof that political discretion carries with it a cost.   
 
Austen-Smith’s finding that voters who are informed about the public good can put a 
break on the activities of special interest groups gives punch to rent-seeking research. 
Political systems that constrain the power of politician to place artificial barriers to the 
flow of information such as campaign spending limits, centralized finances which 
discourage local governmental experiments, and a refusal to allow direct democracy, are 
political systems which will allow voters to become informed about the public good and 
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